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 i 
Abstract 
 
The rapid increase of the female participation rate in the Netherlands gives rise to the 
hypothesis that the willingness of Dutch women to be employed grew strongly. We predict 
the number of hours women are willing to work by using the estimated parameters from a 
multistage least squares Heckit procedure. For a sample of Dutch women between 1994 and 
1999 we find that there were significant differences in willingness to work between the 
employed, the unemployed, discouraged workers, and other non-participants. We also find a 
positive trend in the willingness to work for these groups, which seems to be almost entirely 
based on the changing individual characteristics of women, in particular the increase of the 
average level of education. Changing wages stimulated the working individuals, but had a 
negative effect on the willingness to work of the non-workers, who were on average lower 
educated. The effects of wages and preferences nearly outweighed each other for the non-
workers.  
 
Key words: Female labour force participation, labour supply, discouraged workers, business 
cycle, unemployment 
JEL-Code: H2, J22 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyses the remarkable increase in female labour force participation during the 
second half of the 1990s in the Netherlands, when the Dutch economy was in an upswing. If 
women adjust their behaviour to the general labour market situation, the flexibility of the 
labour market may be increased considerably. Due to the ‘discouraged worker effect’ women 
may be less inclined to find a job when unemployment rates are high,1 whereas in the upward 
fluctuation of the business cycle they may seek for jobs more actively. For example, Finegan 
(1981) found for the U.S. that many people are counted as non-participants when 
unemployment is high, whereas they do enter the labour market when unemployment is low. 
Darby et al. (2001) tested the significance of these participation reactions to upward and 
downward fluctuations in the business cycle. In their empirical analysis of four countries2 
they found empirical evidence for the responses of participation rates to the business cycle. 
Instead of looking at the change in participation rates from a macroeconomic 
perspective, we will analyse the change in the willingness to work of women by the use of a 
microeconomic framework. In this way, we will try to find the causes of increasing female 
labour force participation in the Netherlands. The rapid increase of the female participation 
rate in the Netherlands gives rise to the hypothesis that the willingness of women to be 
employed grew strongly. This may have been due to both the long-term upward trend in 
female labour force participation,3 which may be related to changing preferences as well as to 
changing individual characteristics, and the cyclical upturn in the period under consideration, 
which may be related to the tightening of the labour market and rising wages.  
Our contribution to the existing participation literature is threefold. Firstly, we will test 
the hypothesis of a growing willingness to work by using the estimated parameters from a 
three-stage least squares Heckit procedure to predict the number of hours women are willing 
to work in the course of six years. We will also test whether this holds for the ‘discouraged 
workers’, who are willing to work but do not search for a job, and for three other groups of 
women, including the employed, the unemployed and other participants.  
Secondly, since the discouraged workers may to some extent have similar 
characteristics and preferences as the unemployed4, we will test whether the differences in the 
willingness to work between the four groups of women are statistically significant. It may be 
                                                          
1.  This phenomenon is known as ‘hidden unemployment’ since persons who do not search for a job are not 
counted as unemployed. 
2.  They also found that the fall of female participation rates during cyclical downturns were significantly 
larger than the rise of participations rates in upturns. The countries included in the empirical analysis were 
France, Japan, the United States and Sweden. The ‘discouraged worker effect’ turned out to be most 
prevalent in the former three countries, in particular for the 45-54 year age group of women. 
3.  In general, labour force participation of women has been rising continuously during the last decades, not 
only in the Netherlands but also in many other countries of the European Union (European Commission, 
2001). In the Netherlands, there is a structural upward trend of female labour force participation since the 
1960s (Vendrik, 1993; CPB, 2000; WRR, 2000). 
4.  For an empirical analysis of the distinction between unemployed and discouraged people, see for example 
Flinn and Heckman (1983), Tano (1991), Gönöl (1991) and Jones and Riddell (1998). The empirical results 
of these studies are somewhat mixed. In general, one may conclude that the distinction between 
unemployed and discouraged people matters more for females than for males, and more for younger (till 25 
years old) than for older people. 
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expected that the workers in the sample are on average most willing to work, followed by the 
unemployed, the discouraged workers and other non-participants. The women belonging to 
the last group explicitly stated that they were not willing to work, which allows us to compare 
their subjective statement on the willingness to work with our empirical findings based on the 
individual background characteristics (e.g. age, education, having children, having a partner). 
Thirdly, to reveal the causes of the estimated changes in the willingness to work 
between years, we will decompose these changes into changes due to preferences, wages and 
individual characteristics for the four groups of women over time. Our decomposition 
technique is partly comparable to that of Gomulka and Stern (1990) and Groot and Pott-Buter 
(1993), who explicitly include the participation decision in their analysis. However, we focus 
on the changes in the average number of hours to analyse the development of the willingness 
to work of the four groups of women. This is another novelty of our analysis. 
 Section 2 discusses the relationship between the growing female labour force 
participation and the falling unemployment level (i.e. the tightening of the labour market) in 
the Netherlands during the last decade of the 20th century. Section 3 refers to the data set used. 
In Section 4, we will discuss our estimation results and compare these to the results found in 
other empirical studies. In Section 5, we will test the differences in the willingness to work 
between the four groups of women mentioned before. We will also analyse the reasons (pre-
ferences, wages, individual characteristics) for the positive trend in the willingness to work 
during the period under consideration. Lastly, we will draw our conclusions in Section 6. 
 
 
2.  Female labour force participation and labour market tightness in the 
 Netherlands 
 
The Dutch labour market situation has changed considerably in recent years. Around 1994, 
the Netherlands experienced a situation with high unemployment rates, whereas in the late 
1990s unemployment rates were so low that employers had serious difficulties to find 
adequate personnel. Due to falling unemployment rates and increasing labour market 
shortages, the activation of non-working women to participate on the labour market became a 
matter of great interest in the Netherlands. This held in particular for non-participating women 
willing to work but not searching for a job, i.e. the ‘discouraged workers’. More than two 
thirds of the discouraged workers is female (ROA, 2001). 
 In 1991, the female labour force participation rate was 44.9 percent, while in 2000 the 
participation rate stood at 54.8 percent. The last column of Table 1 shows the yearly increase 
of female labour force participation rates during the 1990s. Contrary to the rise of the 
participation rates of women during 1993 and 1994, participation rates of men did not 
increase during these years. Therefore, participation rates of men seem to be more related to 
the excess supply on the labour market in those years than the participation rates of women. 
During the early 1990s, the Netherlands experienced a stagnating economy, which resulted in 
a peak unemployment rate of 8.5 percent in 1994. For women, the peak was even 11.4 percent 
in 1994. 
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Table 1 
Changes in rates of unemployment and labour force participation in the Netherlands, 1992-2000 
   
Year Change in unemployment 
ratea 
Change in participation rateb  
 Total Men Women 
 in % points in % points in % points 
    
    
1992  0.1 0.6 0.8 
1993  0.6 0.0 1.3 
1994  0.6 0.0 0.6 
1995 -0.1 0.8 1.4 
1996 -0.4 0.3 1.0 
1997 -0.5 0.8 1.9 
1998 -0.9 0.8 1.0 
1999 -0.5 0.4 1.5 
2000 -0.8 0.8 2.1 
    
a.  Total unemployment as a percentage of the labour force (15 to 65 years old), change is relative 
to t-1.5 
b.  Labour force as a percentage of the working-age population (15 to 65 years old), change is 
relative to t-1. 
Source: Labour Force Survey (1991-2000), Statistics Netherlands 
 
The excess of labour supply over demand in a recessional period decreased the chances of 
getting a job and tended to push down real wages. As a result the expected benefits of job 
search declined, which led to a decrease in search activities. Unemployed people and people 
who would otherwise have entered the labour force became 'discouraged' and remained 
outside the labour force. By definition, discouraged workers are willing to accept a job but do 
not search for work. The loose labour market of 1994, with relatively many discouraged 
workers, gradually switched to a tight labour market during the next few years. In 2000 the 
unemployment rate had fallen to 3.8 percent (5.4 percent for women). The percentage of 
discouraged workers in the population also decreased: the number of ‘discouraged workers’ 
fell from 327,500 in 1994 (3.6 percent of the population) to 216,000 in 1999 (2.3 percent of 
the population).6 
 For two reasons, female labour force participation rates continued to increase during 
the 1990s, despite the loose labour market in 1993 and 1994. Firstly, as stated above, there 
was a structural upward trend of the female labour force participation rate during the last three 
decades, whereas for men the overall trend during this period was downward (WRR, 2000). 
Therefore it is not surprising that the rise of the female labour force participation rate was less 
disturbed by a recession than the relatively recent upward movement of the male labour force 
participation rate in the Netherlands. Secondly, if a husband in a traditional family lost his job 
                                                          
5.  In Table 1, unemployment is measured according to the official definition of Statistics Netherlands, in 
which individuals are only counted as unemployed when they have no job of 12 hours per week or more 
and are searching for one. In the next sections of this paper, the international definition of unemployment is 
used, i.e. without the 12-hours border. 
6.  The population is here restricted to all individuals between 15 and 64 years old and excludes those in initial 
education. See ROA (2001), chapter 4. 
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and became unemployed during the recession years in the Netherlands, other family members, 
in particular his wife, might have decided to enter the labour force to compensate for the 
decreased family income. This upward pressure on the female participation rate due to the 
'added' female workers partly offsets the downward pressure on the participation rate due to 
the 'discouraged' female workers.7  
 The above analysis leads to the expectation that the willingness of women to supply 
themselves on the labour market has increased since 1994. This expectation follows from both 
the structural upward trend of the female labour force participation rate and the recovery of 
the Dutch economy - related to the tightening of the labour market - since 1994. The next 
sections show the results of the empirical microeconomic analysis with regard to the change 
in the willingness to work of both employed or non-working women between 1994 and 1999. 
 
 
3. Data description 
 
The data set was drawn from the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) of Statistics Netherlands. This 
panel contains microdata on about 5,000 Dutch households. We selected the years 1994 to 
1999. The selection of these years was dictated by the availability of data sets incorporating 
more or less the same variables, since not all variables that we needed to conduct our 
empirical analysis were included in the data sets of the years before 1994. All women in the 
age of 15 to 65 years old were selected, excluding the self-employed because of the lack of 
reliable data on their wages. Those attending full-time education and disabled persons were 
also excluded, since they are preparing for their labour market entry or are not able to work, 
respectively. 
 In our sample, we define employed women (E) as those working at least one hour per 
week. Women are considered to be unemployed (UE) if they have been searching for a job for 
more than one hour per week during the last four weeks, and are able to start working within 
three months. Within the group of non-participants (NP), who do not belong to the labour 
force, we distinguish between women who are willing to work (W) and those who are not 
(NW).8 Women in the former group can be characterised as ‘discouraged workers’ because 
they want a job but gave up searching for one. By making use of the panel character of the 
data, we are able to show the changes in labour force states of women between 1994 and 
1999. Table 2 clearly shows that many women started to work during the period between 
1994 and 1999. 63 percent of the women who were unemployed in 1994 had a job in 1999. 
For the non-participating women who had a job in 1999, these percentages are much lower, 
namely 43 percent of those willing to work in 1994 and 19 percent of those not willing to 
work in 1994. This can be regarded as a first indication of the larger willingness to work of 
                                                          
7.  However, empirical research reveals that the ‘discouraged worker effect’ clearly dominates the ‘added 
worker effect’. This is straightforward since the former effect is related to a fall in expected real wages 
during a recession, which affects nearly every household, whereas the latter effect only emerges from 
families whose normal breadwinner loses a job. For a thorough recent analysis on the ‘added worker 
effect’, see Stephens (2001). 
8.  Based on the question: 'Are you willing to work?' 
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the unemployed relative to discouraged workers and other non-participants. In turn, the 
discouraged workers reveal a larger willingness to work than other non-participants. 
 
Table 2 
Changes in labour force states, 1994 to 19999 
   
  Labour force state in 1999, 
percentage of total number in 1994 
 Total  number in 1994*  
E 
 
UE 
 
NP W 
 
NP NW 
      
      
Labour force state in 
1994** 
     
E 1302 86 2 4 7 
UE 98 63 5 14 17 
NP W 249 43 12 19 25 
NP NW 493 19 3 9 70 
      
Notes: 
*)  Total number minus sample outflow 
**)  E = employed; UE = unemployed; NP W = non-participating willing to work; NP NW = non-
participating not willing to work 
 
Table 3 presents the levels of education of the total sample of women in the subsequent years. 
The table indicates that in the sample of 1999 significantly more women were highly educated 
than in the sample of 1994. This increase in the share of highly educated people is most 
profound in the working group (see Table A.2 in Appendix A). 
 
Table 3 
Sample structure of women according to the level of education, 1994 to 199910 
       
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Level of education*  % % % % % % 
       
       
PE + LSE 43.5 39.6 37.6 34.5 32.9 29.7 
HSE 40.2 41.9 43 44.1 44.9 46.6 
HVE 13.8 15.4 16 17.2 17.5 18.4 
UvE 2.5 3.1 3.4 4.2 4.7  5.4 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number 3378 3234 3421 3278 3260 3065 
       
*) PE = primary education; LSE = lower secondary education; HSE = higher secondary education; 
HVE = higher vocational education; UvE = university education. 
Source: Socio-Economic Panel, Statistics Netherlands 
 
                                                          
9.  In Table A.1 in Appendix A the frequencies and shares of the four groups of women are presented for all 
years  in the period of 1994 to 1999. 
10.  See Appendix A for an overview of the education levels per group. 
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 Other variables in the empirical analysis of female labour supply include the average 
number of hours worked per week, net real wage per hour, other income, age, number and age 
of children.11 The average number of hours worked per week was slightly higher in 1999 than 
in 1994. This may be the result of both a higher participation rate among women and a higher 
average number of hours worked by the employed women. The net real wage per hour 
increased over the years, in particular between 1997 and 1998 (Table A.3). When 1999 is 
compared with 1994, it can be concluded that the other income (e.g. social insurance benefits 
and a husband's income) decreased for the employed women but increased for the non-
working women (Table A.8). In addition, the discouraged workers had the highest average 
number of children (Table A.4) and the lowest average age of the youngest child (Table A.5). 
The group of discouraged workers had the highest share of women with one or more children: 
around 74 percent with a peak of 78 percent in 1997. In particular for the groups of working 
women and other non-participants these shares are much lower. For the latter group, this share 
decreased over the period (Table A.6). The average age per group of women increased by 
about two years. Only the unemployed were on average about 4 years older in 1999 than in 
1994 (Table A.7).  
 
 
4. Estimation of the labour supply model 
 
The neoclassical static labour supply model that we use is well known and described, among 
others, by Killingsworth (1983). In this model, each individual has a utility function U(C,L,X) 
in which L denotes leisure time, C consumption of goods, and X individual attributes. The 
utility function is assumed to be twice differentiable and concave in C en L. Individuals are 
assumed to maximise utility subject to the budget constraint C = A + WH and time constraint 
T = H + L, in which A denotes the individual’s other income, W the net hourly wage rate, H 
working hours, and T total time. Solving the first-order conditions leads to the labour supply 
function H = H(W,A,X). 
 The purpose of this section is to estimate the labour supply behaviour of women and 
particularly to reveal the change in their preferences to work during a period of time. For our 
purpose, we estimate a semi-log specification of the labour supply function  
 
(1) H = c + α lnW + βA + γX + ε 
 
The problem that occurs in estimating labour supply functions is that hours of work are 
censored. This means that the hours of work variable is zero for the unemployed and non-
participants. In addition, data on wages are not available for non-working women. This im-
plies that we can only observe wages for employed women. A labour supply function esti-
mated by Ordinary Least Squares would therefore suffer from sample selectivity bias. To cor-
rect for this bias, the inverse Mill’s ratio is implemented as a variable in the labour supply 
                                                          
11.  See Appendix A for an overview of the sample averages of these variables. 
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equation (see Heckman, 1974). This ratio is calculated in a probit function for the entire 
sample of working and non-working women.12 The excluded variables in the labour supply 
function - as opposed to the regressors in the probit function - serve as instruments for the 
wage in the two-stage least squares technique that is used to calculate the labour supply 
function (Killingsworth, 1983). Following Mincer (1974), we use tenure, approximated by 
years of work in the current firm, and level of education (see Table 3) as instruments for the 
wage.13 
 
Table 4 
Estimation results of the labour supply model with hours of work per week as dependent variable, and 
tenure and education used as instruments for lnW14 (standard errors in parentheses).  
       
Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
       
       
'LnW' 13.35*** 
(2.22) 
12.35*** 
(2.20) 
10.50*** 
(1.76) 
8.13*** 
(1.67) 
11.92*** 
(1.79) 
11.74*** 
(2.56) 
Alt. income (year- 
ly /10,000) 
-0.39*** 
(0.11) 
-0.67*** 
(0.12) 
-0.61*** 
(0.11) 
-0.56*** 
(0.10) 
-0.60*** 
(0.12) 
-0.59*** 
(0.12) 
Child (0-2) -10.76*** 
(0.82) 
-10.17*** 
(0.81) 
-10.37*** 
(0.75) 
-10.15*** 
(0.72) 
-10.88*** 
(0.74) 
-10.84*** 
(0.95) 
Child (3-5) -10.75*** 
(0.95) 
-9.02*** 
(1.24) 
-8.29*** 
(1.01) 
-10.07*** 
(1.01) 
-9.15*** 
(0.95) 
-10.45*** 
(0.97) 
Child (6-12) -9.44*** 
(0.84) 
-6.91*** 
(0.88) 
-8.31*** 
(0.73) 
-8.48*** 
(0.76) 
-8.39*** 
(0.73) 
-7.83*** 
(0.78) 
Child (>12) -5.23*** 
(0.90) 
-4.66*** 
(0.80) 
-5.56*** 
(0.71) 
-5.34*** 
(0.69) 
-3.70*** 
(0.75) 
-3.39*** 
(0.80) 
Age -0.10 
(0.28) 
-0.07 
(0.28) 
0.45* 
(0.23) 
0.53** 
(0.25) 
0.23 
(0.24) 
0.20 
(0.25) 
Agesq -0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
InvMill’s -10.18*** 
(0.57) 
-10.81*** 
(0.66) 
-11.36*** 
(0.52) 
-11.10*** 
(0.51) 
-8.98*** 
(0.63) 
-10.00*** 
(1.40) 
Intercept 5.59 
(5.14) 
7.31 
(5.68) 
1.59 
(4.49) 
6.87 
(4.99) 
2.45 
(4.52) 
5.79 
(5.98) 
       
R-sq adjusted 0.41 0.36 0.42 0.40 0.34 0.26 
       
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level 
 
 
                                                          
12.  The results of this probit estimation and wage function parameters are shown in Appendix B. 
13.  In our estimation procedure, we follow Killingsworth's (1983) so-called 'Procedure VIII'. As he extensively 
discusses, this procedure has many advantages over the other procedures he mentions. For example, this 
procedure accounts for discontinuities in the labour supply. Therefore the lowest number of hours 
individuals will work may be substantially in excess of one hour, which implies that individuals will not 
work unless the gain of working is large enough to overcome the fixed costs such as appropriate work 
clothing and the transportation to work.  
14.  Net hourly wage and other income are corrected for inflation. Other income is measured by the disposable 
family income (including subsidies, alimony, etc.) minus the income that the woman earned by working. 
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 The estimated coefficients in Table 4 reveal that having children has a strong negative 
impact on the hours supplied. The impact of having a child in the age of 0 to 2 years or 3 to 5 
years old on hours of work was about the same in 1994 and 1999. For the two older age 
groups, we can see a more or less downward trend of the impact of having children on the 
labour supply decision. Moreover, an F-test reveals a significant total effect of age and age-
squared for all years. The significant inverse Mill’s ratio shows that there is sample selectivity 
bias, as could be expected. Table 4 shows, lastly, that the net hourly wage has a significantly 
positive effect on the number of hours worked per week, whereas the effect of other income is 
significantly negative. Both results are more or less standard. The impact of the net hourly 
wage on the number of hours worked per week seems to have declined over time, in particular 
after 1995. The impact of other income on hours worked is greater after 1994. 
 Given the semi-log labour supply specification, we can derive the uncompensated 
Marshallian wage elasticity (EW) and income elasticity (EA), using 
 
(2) EW  = HHW
H α
=
∂
∂ 1
ln
 
 
(3) EA = H
A
H
A
A
H β=
∂
∂  
 
For the total sample of women in 1994, the average number of working hours per week H was 
14.1 and the average other income A was 3.8 (i.e. 38,000 guilders per year15). By imputing 
these averages into Equations (2) and (3), the uncompensated wage and income elasticities 
were calculated for 1994 to 1999. Moreover, the compensated wage elasticities were 
calculated by subtracting the income elasticities from the uncompensated wage elasticities. 
These compensated wage elasticities indicate women’s preference to substitute own wage 
earnings for leisure, keeping their income constant. 
 As was noticed by for example Killingsworth (1983), it is difficult to compare the 
estimates of the labour supply elasticities in the various empirical studies due to the very 
different sample selections and estimation techniques. In addition, the elasticities themselves 
are functions of the average wage rate and hours of work (see above), which are defined and 
measured quite differently in empirical studies on labour supply.  
 Our estimated elasticities of Table 5 definitely fall within the broad range in survey 
studies by for example Killingsworth (1983), Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), and 
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). Furthermore, in a survey of Dutch labour supply studies, 
Theeuwes (1988) concluded that on average female uncompensated wage elasticity was 1.39, 
income elasticity was –0.16 and compensated wage elasticity was 1.55. The average wage 
elasticities are about 0.6 larger than the wage elasticities presented in Table 5, whereas the 
income elasticities are very much alike. Groot and Pott-Buter (1993) presented even larger 
wage elasticities than the uncompensated wage elasticities reported by Theeuwes (1988), 
                                                          
15.  Note that 1 euro equals 2.20371 guilders. 
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namely 2.4 and 2.0 for a sample of married women in 1979 and 1987, respectively. Apart 
from the fact that the period under consideration and the sample of married women used 
differed in the study by Groot and Pott-Buter (1993), the differences with our results can be 
explained by the estimation technique used. As noted by Killingsworth (1983), our estimation 
procedure allows for a discontinuous labour supply schedule, which typically produces 
smaller female labour supply elasticities than estimation procedures that assume a continuous 
labour supply schedule, such as the empirical study by Groot and Pott-Buter (1993). Lastly, 
van Soest et al. (1990) reported female uncompensated wage elasticities of 0.65 and 0.79 
(depending on the model used) and an income elasticity of –0.23 for a cross-section of Dutch 
households in 1985. Their empirical model accounts for the effect of taxes. 
 
Table 5 
Wage and income elasticities, 1994 to 1999 
      
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
      
       
Uncompensated wage elasticities 0.95 0.88 0.74 0.58 0.85 0.83 
       
Income elasticities -0.11 -0.18 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 
       
Compensated wage elasticities 1.06 1.06 0.90 0.73 1.01 0.99 
       
 
 Table 5 shows that both uncompensated and compensated wage elasticities were 
smaller in 1999 than in 1994. Wages elasticities were the smallest in 1997. Income elasticity 
increased in absolute terms during this period, although it seems to have been fairly stable 
from 1996 onwards. The changes in both wage and income elasticities imply that it was on 
average more costly to induce women to increase their supply of hours in 1999 than in 1994, 
and that women seem to have become more responsive to income from other sources such as 
their husband's or male partner's income, social security benefits, or alimony. 
 
 
5. The willingness to work and the labour force status of women 
 
The willingness to work of women can at first instance simply be determined by looking at 
their labour force status. It is reasonable to expect that women who already work, on average 
have the greatest willingness to work, followed by unemployed women. Both groups of 
women are considered to be part of the labour force. The remaining women are outside the 
labour force and can be classified in two groups: those who are willing (and able) to accept a 
job and those who are not willing. It follows that we can distinguish between four groups of 
women with a subsequently declining willingness to work: employed, unemployed, non-
participating but willing to work, and non-participating but not willing to work. In this 
section, we will test whether the willingness to work of these four groups matches the 
estimation results of the labour supply model from the previous section. We therefore 
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calculate the average number of supplied hours for each group of women - for non-working 
women as if they were working, see below - by using the estimation results of the last section.  
 Evidently, unemployed and non-participating women are in reality not working, due to 
for example the fixed cost of working and the limited availability of (part-time) jobs. Blundell 
and MaCurdy (1999) referred to various studies that model the transportation cost to work and 
the wage-hours packages offered by employers. It is, however, not our intention to do so, 
since we are interested in knowing how the women's preferences developed with respect to 
their willingness to work between 1994 and 1999. We utilized the difference between 
predicted and actual working hours that results from fixed costs in the decision to work, to 
proxy the willingness to work. To test for the differences in willingness to work of the four 
groups of women, we calculated the average hours that women supply or would supply, 
irrespective of their participation in the labour market. These were calculated by applying the 
parameters of the estimated labour supply functions of the period from 1994 to 1999 to the 
1994 sample of women. By controlling for changes in individual characteristics of women in 
subsequent sample years, we intend to reveal the changes in preferences of the four groups of 
women over time. 
 Table 6 presents the average estimated working hours for the four groups of women 
for the period 1994 to 1999. The estimates reveal the expected order in declining willingness 
to work for the four groups of women. These differences between the groups of women are 
significant at the 1% level. This underlines the importance of the distinction between the four 
labour force states of women. Therefore, Table 6 also confirms the results found in the above-
mentioned empirical studies on the distinction between unemployed and discouraged workers. 
The group of discouraged workers is separated from other non-participants by their answer to 
a subjective question ('Are you willing to work?'). Our results show that we can predict a 
positive answer to this question by just looking at the individual characteristics of women. 
The distinction between unemployed, discouraged workers and other non-participants is also 
in accordance with the real labour market behaviour of women, as shown in the data 
description of Section 3. 
 
Table 6 
Estimated average number of hours supplied for women of four distinct labour force states, 1994-1999 
       
  Mean 1994 Mean 1995 Mean 1996 Mean 1997 Mean 1998 Mean 1999 
       
       
Total 17.4 19.0 18.0 19.1 20.1 21.6 
E 25.6 25.9 25.3 25.8 25.9 25.9 
UE 13.8 13.8 12.3 13.3 14.6 19.5 
NP W 11.1 12.5 10.7 11.2 13.5 17.3 
NP NW 5.0 6.9 4.5 5.1 6.9 11.1 
       
Note: E = employed, UE = unemployed, NP W = non-participating but willing to work, NP NW = 
non-participating but not willing to work. 
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 The willingness to work shows an upward trend for the groups of non-working 
women, with a minimum in 1996. The number of hours women are willing to work increased 
in particular between 1998 and 1999. Furthermore, it seems that the fixed costs of 
participation on the labour market requires a minimum of about 12 hours of work per week. 
Women who may be interested in working less than 12 hours per week, often do not search 
for a job or will not accept a job for a few hours per week due to the relatively high fixed 
costs of working.16 
 The difference in the willingness to work over the years can be broken down into the 
effects of (1) changing individual characteristics, (2) changing preferences, and (3) changing 
market wages. Table 7 presents the separately calculated effects of changing preferences and 
changing market wages. We implemented the estimated labour supply and market wage 
functions of all years to the 1994 sample of women, thereby controlling for individual 
characteristics. The first column shows the effect of changing preferences. The effect of 
changing market wages is shown in the first row of every group of women. The diagonal for 
each group shows the combined effect of changing market wages and preferences. 
 The first conclusion that can be drawn from Table 7 is that the impact of both 
changing market wages and changing preferences is smaller than the total effect when 
changing individual characteristics (see Table 6) are included. Secondly, the impact of 
changing preferences on the willingness to work was positive for all groups and all years, 
with the exception of 1996 and 1997 (and 1998 for working women).17 The impact of 
changing market wages on the willingness to work for working women is positive when 1999 
is compared to 1994, although the difference is only small. However, the opposite occurs for 
non-workers: the impact of changing market wages is negative over the whole period. 
Together, market wages and preferences have had a positive effect for workers, just a small 
positive effect for unemployed and discouraged workers and a negative effect for all other 
non-participants. It can be concluded that the positive trend in the willingness to work for 
non-working women is almost completely due to changing individual characteristics.18 
Especially the average education level contributed to this shift, as it significantly increased for 
all groups between 1994 and 1999 (see Appendix A). 
 In Appendix C we show by simulation that the participation rate of especially 
discouraged workers would rise if there was no effect of children on the willingness to work, 
for example as a result of greatly improved child care facilities. Non-working women would 
increase their willingness to work significantly more than working women if they did not 
have an alternative source of income (e.g. became less dependent of their partner). These 
                                                          
16.  It should be noticed that our estimation of the labour supply function is based on actual hours worked. 
Female workers may desire to work more or fewer hours per week than their actual hours worked. Euwals 
and Van Soest (1999) argued that observed desired hours reflect underlying preferences better than actual 
hours. However, they found a substantial correlation between desired and actual working hours. They also 
found that hours restrictions of those who wanted to work were mainly due to involuntary employment and 
lack of part-time jobs. 
17.  Almost all differences between years across the rows and columns of Table 7 are significant at the 1%-
level. 
18.  Also Groot and Pott-Buter (1993) found a relatively strong impact of individual characteristics on 
participation for the Netherlands between 1979 and 1987. 
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results show that having children plays an important role in particular for the willingness to 
work in discouraged workers, and that non-working women in general are more responsive to 
alternative sources of income than employed women. 
 
Table 7 
The effects of changing market wages and changing preferences on the estimated hours of work, 
sample of 199419  
        
Group Year of 
preferences 
Wage 
1994 
Wage 
1995 
Wage 
1996 
Wage 
1997 
Wage 
1998 
Wage 
1999 
        
        
E 1994 25.6 25.3 25.2 25.2 25.5 25.8 
 1995 26.0 25.9     
 1996 25.0  24.9    
 1997 25.3   25.2   
 1998 25.2    25.4  
 1999 26.7     27.2 
        
UE 1994 13.8 13.2 13.4 13.4 13.2 11.8 
 1995 14.0 13.6     
 1996 12.7  12.5    
 1997 13.5   13.4   
 1998 14.8    14.5  
 1999 15.4     14.0 
        
NP W 1994 11.1 10.6 10.7 10.9 10.6 9.1 
 1995 11.4 11.2     
 1996 10.2  10.1    
 1997 10.8   10.8   
 1998 12.4    12.1  
 1999 12.8     11.3 
        
NP NW 1994 5.0 4.8 5.6 5.1 4.7 3.4 
 1995 5.2 5.2     
 1996 3.3  3.9    
 1997 3.8   4.0   
 1998 6.0    5.9  
 1999 5.6     4.4 
        
Note: E = employed, UE = unemployed, NP W = non-participating but willing to work, NP NW = 
non-participating but not willing to work. 
 
 
                                                          
19.  An extensive overview of the results is given in Appendix D. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have analysed to what extent the remarkable increase in female labour 
participation between 1994 and 1999 in the Netherlands was due to the increase in the 
willingness to work. We distinguished between the group of working women and three groups 
of non-working women: unemployed, non-participating but willing to work (discouraged 
workers), and non-participating but not willing to work. The average number of working 
hours of the last three groups of women was estimated as if they were employed, which gave 
an indication of their willingness to work. We analysed whether the willingness to work 
changed due to changing market wages, changing preferences, or changing individual 
characteristics during the period under consideration.  
We found that there were significant differences between the four groups of women in 
their willingness to work. The employed were most willing to work, the unemployed were 
more willing to work than the discouraged workers, and the other non-participants were least 
willing to work. The group of discouraged workers was separated from the other non-
participants by the answer to a subjective question ('Are you willing to work?'). Our results 
show that a positive answer to this question is correlated to both changes in labour force 
participation over time and the estimated number of hours women are willing to work. The 
latter implies that we can predict the willingness to work of women by merely looking at their 
individual characteristics. 
Moreover, we found a positive trend in the willingness to work for all groups during 
the period under consideration. This increase was for only a small part due to changing 
preferences. The positive trend in the willingness to work for women between 1994 and 1999 
seems to be almost entirely based on the changing individual characteristics of women, in 
particular the increase of the average level of education. Changing wages have stimulated 
working individuals but have had a negative effect on the willingness to work among non-
workers. This suggests that wages were not only positively affected by the upswing but that 
the lower educated part of the labour market was at the same time hit by skill-biased 
technological change (see e.g. Bartel and Sicherman, 1999). This also suggests that the 
positive trend in female willingness to work was not induced by the cyclical upswing. If 
combined, the effects of wages and preferences nearly outweigh each other for the 
unemployed and discouraged workers. The net effect of wages and preferences on other non-
participants is even negative. 
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Appendix A20 
 
Table A.1 
Sample structure of women according to four distinct labour force states, 1994 to 1999 
       
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
  Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
E 1866 55.2 1904 58.9 2054 60 2059 62.8 2107 64.6 2137 66.0 
             
             
UE 144 4.3 144 4.5 209 6.1 156 4.8 128 3.9 120 3.7 
NP W 371 11 386 11.9 333 9.7 301 9.2 278 8.5 251 7.7 
NP NW 997 29.5 800 24.7 825 24.1 762 23.2 747 22.9 731 22.6 
Total 3378 100 3234 100 3421 100 3278 100 3260 100  3239 100  
             
Note: E = employed; UE = unemployed; NP W = non-participating but willing to work; NP NW = 
non-participating but not willing to work.  
 
Table A.2 
Level of education, 1994 to 1999 
        
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
  % % % % % % 
        
        
E PE + LSE 31.5 28.8 25.9 23.5 21.9 20.3 
 HSE 45.6 46.4 48.9 49.1 49.8 49.7 
 HVE 19.0 20.4 20.4 21.4 21.6 22.8 
 UvE 3.9 4.5 4.8 5.9 6.6 7.2 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Number 1866 1904 2054 2058 2107 2137 
        
UE PE + LSE 45.1 46.5 45.0 42.3 40.6 37.5 
 HSE 41.7 38.2 36.4 35.3 38.3 41.7 
 HVE 11.1 12.5 14.8 19.2 18.8 17.5 
 UvE 2.1 2.8 3.8 3.2 2.3 3.3 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Number 144 144 209 156 128 120 
        
NP W PE + LSE 48.2 46.1 43.5 45.5 43.9 42.2 
 HSE 42.0 42.0 42.3 41.9 40.6 44.6 
 HVE 8.4 10.1 13.8 11.6 14.0 10.0 
 UvE 1.3 1.8 0.3 1.0 1.4 3.2 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Number 371 386 333 301 278 251 
 
                                                          
20.  All data is drawn from the different waves of the Socio-Economic Panel 1994-1999 (Statistics 
Netherlands). For more background information about the groups in the Netherlands we refer to ROA 
(2001). 
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Table A.2 (continued) 
Level of education, 1994 to 1999 
        
NP NW PE + LSE 64.1 61.0 62.5 58.1 58.4 51.4 
 HSE 29.2 31.8 30.3 33.1 33.6 38.7 
 HVE 6.4 6.8 6.3 7.6 7.0 8.6 
 UvE 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.2 
 Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Number 997 800 825 762 747 731 
        
 
Table A.3 
Sample structure of women according to other individual characteristics, 1994 to 1999 
       
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
  Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev Mean St.Dev 
             
             
Age 40.4 12.1 40 11.6 40.7 11.8 40.8 11.6 41.1 11.6 41.5 11.4 
Hours worked 
per weekb 
25.6 12.7 25.9 12.9 25.3 12.4 25.8 12.4 25.9 11.8 25.9 11.9 
Other income 
(yearly 
/10,000) c  
3.9 2.7 3.7 2.4 3.8 3.0 3.8 2.7 3.7 2.5 3.8 2.4 
Net monthly 
wage b, c 
1590 949 1636 993 1600 973 1659 969 1727 988 1724 957 
Net hourly 
wageb, c 
14.2 4.8 14.4 5.2 14.5 5.4 14.7 5.0 15.2 5.4 15.4 5.4 
             
a) Only for women with a child. 
b) Only for the working group.  
c) Guilders per month, 1995 prices. 
 
Table A.4 
Average number of children of women, 1994 to 1999 
       
Labour 
force states 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
       
       
E 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.98 1.02 
UE 1.09 1.35 1.39 1.35 1.37 1.26 
NP W 1.51 1.49 1.44 1.61 1.51 1.56 
NP NW 1.06 1.07 0.98 0.92 0.90 0.93 
Total 1.05 1.06 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.05 
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Table A.5 
Average age of youngest child, 1994 to 1999 
       
Labour 
force states 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
       
       
E 9.5 9.4 9.5 9.3 9.1 9.4 
UE 10.1 8.7 8.8 9.5 9.9 9.9 
NP W 8.5 8.1 8.3 8.3 8.8 8.1 
NP NW 9.5 10.1 10.1 9.9 9.9 10.2 
       
 
Table A.6 
Percentage of women with at least one child, 1994 to 1999 
       
Labour 
force states 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
       
       
E 51 51 51 51 53 54 
UE 58 71 71 71 73 65 
NP W 74 75 73 78 73 73 
NP NW 52 53 48 46 45 46 
       
 
Table A.7 
Average years of age of women, 1994 to 1999 
       
Labour 
force states 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
       
       
E 36.5 36.8 37.3 37.6 37.8 38.5 
UE 36.6 36.8 37.5 38.9 39.4 40.3 
NP W 37.5 37.9 39.0 39.3 39.9 39.3 
NP NW 49.2 49.3 50.5 50.5 51.0 51.1 
       
 
Table A.8 
Average yearly other income of women (divided by 10,000), 1994 to 1999 
       
Labour 
force states 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
       
       
E 3.6 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 
UE 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.0 
NP W 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.3 4.1 4.2 
NP NW 4.5 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.6 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B.1 
Estimations of Probit function parameters with Maximum Likelihood  
       
 
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
       
       
Intercept -0.41 -0.05 -0.22 0.57 -0.02 0.03 
Age 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.05** 
Age-sq (*100) -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07** -0.05* -0.10*** -0.11*** 
Age*tenure 0.15 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.02*** 
Age*tenure-sq 
(*1000) 
-132.50 8.94 -32.74 17.37 3.69 -0.002*** 
Age-sq.*tenure 
(*1000) 
-1.59 -0.12 -0.23 0.51 0.03 0.21*** 
Age-sq.*tenure-sq. 
(*100.000) 
150.80 -12.30 19.40 -12.10 1.74 0.03*** 
Tenure 6.08 8.60 8.12 9.39 8.09 0.54*** 
Tenure-sq. 2.55 -0.69 -0.22 -0.83 -0.49 0.00*** 
Alt. income/1000 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.06*** 
Child(0-2) -0.42*** -0.74*** -0.48*** -0.69*** -0.72*** -0.55*** 
Child(3-5) -0.41*** -0.53*** -0.41*** -0.46*** -0.68** -0.45*** 
Child(6-12) -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.14 -0.22* -0.14 
Child(>12) 0.14 0.19* 0.26** 0.18 0.13 0.27*** 
School(HSE) 0.16** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 
School(HVE) 0.30** 0.49*** 0.40*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.56*** 
School(UvE) 0.90*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.77*** 0.81*** 0.84*** 
       
Mean Dependent 
var 
0.55 0.59 0.60 0.63 0.65 0.66 
SE Regression 0.29 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.35 
       
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level 
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Table B.2 
Estimations of the Wage function parameters. 
       
 
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
       
       
Intercept 1.36*** 1.43*** 1.57*** 1.22*** 1.41*** 1.84*** 
Age 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 
Age-sq (*100) -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.02** 
Age*tenure -0.004* -0.002 0.002 -0.004* -0.003 0.0004 
Age*tenure-sq 
(*1000) 
0.20* 0.16 0.004 0.28** 0.31*** -0.00 
Age-sq.*tenure 
(*1000) 
0.04* 0.009 -0.004 0.03 0.02 -0.008 
Age-
sq.*tenure-sq. 
(*100.000) 
-0.19* -0.11 0.05 -0.25* -0.28*** -0.00 
Tenure 0.11*** 0.09** 0.03 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.003 
Tenure-sq. -0.005** -0.006** -0.004 -0.008*** -0.009*** 0.00 
Alt. 
income/1000 
0.006** -0.003 0.006* -0.002 -0.006** 0.000 
Child(0-2) 0.03 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.12*** 0.18*** 
Child(3-5) 0.004 0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.06* 
Child(6-12) -0.05** -0.07*** -0.04* -0.03 -0.01 -0.003 
Child(>12) -0.09*** -0.04* -0.05** -0.05** -0.08*** -0.11*** 
School(HSE) 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 
School(HVE) 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.21*** 
School(UvE) 0.34*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.34*** 
InvMills 
 
-0.007 0.006 0.05** 0.06*** -0.01 -0.25*** 
Mean 
Dependent var 
2.62 2.60 2.61 2.63 2.66 2.66 
SE Regression 
Adj. R-sq. 
0.30 
0.24 
 
0.33 
0.23 
0.33 
0.23 
0.31 
0.27 
0.31 
0.26 
0.32 
0.24 
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level 
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Appendix C 
 
If policy makers want to stimulate non-participants to find work and working women to work 
more hours, they could for instance (1) create better and cheaper child care facilities, and (2) 
stimulate women to become more independent of the income earned by their husbands or 
male partners, social benefits or alimonies. To see how great the impact of particular policy 
measures can be for women of distinct labour force states, we simulated a situation in which 
(1) women do not have any children younger than 20 years old, and (2) women do not have 
any other income. The first simulation should be regarded as the maximum effect on hours 
worked of strongly improved child care facilities. Similarly, the results of the second 
simulation give a clue as to the maximum effect on the hours worked by women if, for 
example, they have no income support or husband who earns the family income. 
 
Table C.1 
Change in number of estimated working hours per group of women, 1994 to 1999 
       
  Mean 1994 Mean 1995 Mean 1996 Mean 1997 Mean 1998 Mean 1999 
  ΔH   ΔH   ΔH   ΔH   ΔH   ΔH   
             
 
Simulation 1 
No children 
                        
Total 4.9  3.9  4.4  4.3  4.1  3.9  
E 4.5  3.7  4.1  4.1  3.9  3.6  
UE 5.2  4.1  4.7  4.6  4.4  4.1  
NP W 6.9  5.5  6.0  6.2  5.8  5.6  
NP NW 4.6  3.8  4.1  4.1  3.9  3.8  
 
Simulation 2 
No other  
income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 1.2  2.7  2.2  2.2  2.7  2.2  
E 1.1  2.5  1.9  2.1  2.4  2.1  
UE 1.2  2.7  2.1  2.2  2.7  2.2  
NP W 1.2  2.7  2.2  2.3  2.7  2.3  
NP NW 1.4  3.2  2.4  2.5  3.0  2.6   
             
Note: E = employed; UE = unemployed; NP W = non-participating but willing to work; NP NW = 
non-participating but not willing to work. 
 
 Table C.1 shows the average estimated increases of hours of work per group of 
women.21 In the first simulation, the non-participating women who are willing to work (the 
                                                          
21.  As before, we estimated the amount of preferred hours by applying the labour supply functions and the 
wage functions of the different years to the 1994 sample of women.  
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‘discouraged workers’), showed the largest increase in hours supplied. The increase of their 
willingness to work was significantly different from the increase of hours of the other groups. 
Moreover, there were no significant differences between the other three groups. The relatively 
large increase of estimated hours of work was due to the large average number of children the 
women of this group had compared to the other groups of women. In every year, they had 
significantly more children than the other groups (see Tables A.4 and A.6). Besides, they had 
the youngest children compared to the other three groups (Table A.5). The increase in 
estimated hours of work may have been large enough to overcome the fixed costs of working, 
in particular for ‘discouraged workers’. This implies that the participation rate of especially 
these women will rise as a result of improved child care facilities. 
 In the second simulation, it was assumed that women had no other income of their 
own or from their husband. The effect on the estimated number of hours supplied was the 
smallest for working women. There was a significant difference (at the 1% level) between 
working and non-working women, but this did not hold for the differences between the three 
groups of non-working women. Table A.8 shows that working women indeed had a lower 
average other income than the women of the other three groups. When other income 
decreases, unemployed women may be willing to accept a job for more hours per week, 
thereby increasing their chances on the labour market. Moreover, due to a lower other income, 
‘discouraged workers’ may be stimulated to search for a job (i.e. they will be part of the 
labour force), since the hours they are willing to supply themselves on the labour market may 
become higher than the minimum number of working hours required to overcome the fixed 
costs of working. This leads to a rise of the participation rate of these women. 
 If 1999 is compared to 1994, it seems that the impact of the above-mentioned 
measures to stimulate female participation on the labour market is reduced in the first 
simulation, which may be a result of growing female independence with regard to having 
children. Moreover, for the second simulation the impact of having no other income seems to 
have increased, which may point to a larger willingness of women to work and earn their own 
income. Nevertheless, for both simulations there was some variation in the additional number 
of hours women are willing to work for the years between 1994 and 1999 
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Appendix D 
 
Table D.1 
Estimated average number of hours supplied for women of four distinct labour force states, 1994-
199922 
       
  Mean 1994 Mean 1995 Mean 1996 Mean 1997 Mean 1998 Mean 1999 
       
Total 17.4 19.0 18.0 19.1 20.1 21.6 
E 25.6 25.9 25.3 25.8 25.9 25.9 
UE 13.8 13.8 12.3 13.3 14.6 19.5 
NP W 11.1 12.5 10.7 11.2 13.5 17.3 
NP NW 5.0 6.9 4.5 5.1 6.9 11.1 
       
 
Table D.2 
Estimated average number of hours supplied for women with 1994 wage functions and individual 
characteristics, and labour supply functions for the years 1994-1999 
       
  Mean 1994 Mean 1995 Mean 1996 Mean 1997 Mean 1998 Mean 1999 
       
       
Total 17.4 17.7 16.5 16.9 17.7 18.4 
E 25.6 26 25 25.3 25.2 26.7 
UE 13.8 14 12.7 13.5 14.8 15.4 
NP W 11.1 11.4 10.2 10.8 12.4 12.8 
NP NW 5.0 5.2 3.3 3.8 6.0  5.6 
       
 
Table D.3 
Estimated average number of hours supplied for women with 1994 labour supply functions and 
individual characteristics, and wage functions for the years 1994-1999 
       
  Mean 1994 Mean 1995 Mean 1996 Mean 1997 Mean 1998 Mean 1999 
       
       
Total 17.4 17.1 17.3 17.2 17.2 16.7 
E 25.6 25.3 25.2 25.2 25.5 25.8 
UE 13.8 13.2 13.4 13.4 13.2 11.8 
NP W 11.1 10.6 10.7 10.9 10.6 9.1 
NP NW 5.0 4.8 5.6 5.1 4.7 3.4 
       
 
 
 
                                                          
22.  Note: E = employed, UE = unemployed, NP W = non-participating but willing to work, NP NW = non- 
 participating but not willing to work. 
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Table D.4 
Estimated average number of hours supplied for women with 1994 individual characteristics, and 
wage and labour supply functions for the years 1994-1999 
       
  Mean 1994 Mean 1995 Mean 1996 Mean 1997 Mean 1998 Mean 1999 
       
       
Total 17.4 17.7 16.5 16.9 17.7 18.2 
E 25.6 25.9 24.9 25.2 25.4 27.2 
UE 13.8 13.6 12.5 13.4 14.5 14.0 
NP W 11.1 11.2 10.1 10.8 12.1 11.3 
NP NW 5.0 5.2 3.9 4.0 5.9 4.4 
       
 
 
